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Abstract: - Recent research shows that colluded malware in different VMs sharing a single physical host may 
use a  resource as a channel to leak critical information. Covert channels employ time or storage characteristics 
to transmit confidential information to attackers leaving no trail.These channels were not meant for 
communication and hence control mechanisms do not exist. This means these remain undetected by traditional 
security measures employed in firewalls etc in a network. The comprehensive survey to address the issue 
highlights that accurate methods for fast detection in cloud are very expensive in terms of storage and 
processing.  The proposed framework builds signature by extracting features which accurately classify the 
regular from covert traffic in cloud and estimates difference in distribution of data under analysis by means of 
scores. It then adds context to the signature and finally using  machine learning (Support Vector Machines),a 
model is built and trained for deploying in cloud. The results show that the framework proposed is high in 
accuracy while being low cost and robust as it is tested after adding noise which is likely to exist in public 
cloud environments.  
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1 Introduction 
 Virtualization is the key enabling technology in 
cloud computing. On one hand coresidency allows 
services to be offered at low cost while on the other 
coresidency with other tenants pose a security threat 
which is a major barrier to mass  adoption of cloud. 
Platform sharing invariably leads to a new set of 
emerging threats. Covert channels in shared 
hardware enable attackers to exfiltrate sensitive 
data. This study has gained momentum after 
research by Ritenpart et al.[15] demonstrated the 
ability of mapping internal cloud infrastructure and 
estimating the likely placement of target VM and 
instantiate new VMs until one of them resides with 
target VM. The secure isolation is broken by covert 
channels in a virtual environment by leaking data 
from a program with higher privileges to the ones 
with lower level of clearance. In cloud this can have 
serious repercussions in which security of data relies 
on strong isolation assumption. 
There are various categories of covert channels for 
leaking information like paging rate, temperature 
based covert channels. But most channels are noisy 
with high error rates. Certain channels like billing of 
used resources may conceal secret information.  
There are two main criteria for categorization of 
covert channels. One is on the basis of storage and 
another one is on the basis of time. Storage based 
covert channels embeds bits in packets for receiver 
to directly read. They have higher bandwidth but are 
relatively easier to detect. In time based channels 
sender exploit time intervals of various resources to 
transmit the bits. Time based covert channels 
engage different resources for sending bits while 
receiver observes and extracts information from 
time charateristics. Two main strategies are usually 
employed to counter time channel attacks. One is 
fuzzy time where the accuracy of the clock is 
disrupted so that common time reference of sender(a 
trojan) and receiver(a spy) is also disrupted. Another 
way is to use lattice scheduling for processor 
scheduling to avoid sender and receiver processes 
be able to run at the same time. With the use of self 
clocking techniques, popular in network 
transmissions, time disruption obstacles can be 
overcome.  
It is argued that multitenant systems can be made 
more secure by identifying possible attacks in the 
cloud architecture and enabling a mechanism for 
detection of such attacks. At a high level, this 
premise is supported by proposed framework for 
covert channel based anomaly detection in cloud 
which attributes its origin to multitenancy in cloud. 
There have been research efforts for detection of 
covert channel attacks, which is an active research 
area. Various methods have been proposed for the 
detection of covert timing channels. Out of various 
approaches proposed in literature for mitigation and 
detection,only a few suitable are found suitable for 
cloud environment and certain techniques of 
detection which provide high accuracy are very 
expensive in terms of processing time and storage. 
The limitations that exists with current 
approaches are that they are  expensive in terms of 
resource, punish innocous traffic and  have their 
doubts of practicality due to legal concerns. Also 
most approaches target very specific single attack 
which limits its use due to lack of generalizability. 
In particular, the paper encompasses wide variety of 
time based covert channel attacks. We have 
proposed an efficient and effective framework 
which has balanced learning methodology and use 
of context enables raise alerts on anomalous use of 
computing resources leading to enhanced accuracy 
in detection. In literature survey authors have not 
found use of context as a parameter in covert 
channel detection.  
Our Contributions can be summarized as follows: 
1. Design of an efficient low cost framework 
for covert channel attack detection in cloud. 
2. To enhance the accuracy in detection  
context is introduced. 
3. Exploration of implementation feasibility in 
distributed systems. 
4.  Balanced learning approach to enable equal 
emphasis on false positives and false 
negatives. 
Remainder of this manuscript is organized into 
various sections. Section 2 gives comprehensive 
survey of related research work done so far in the 
field of covert channel detection. Further in section 
3, we discuss threat model for our framework, 
which explains the scope of threats and entities that 
are part of framework, covered in our research. In 
next section, we explain how the co-residence is 
abused and exploited in multitenant architecture. 
This section also proves the theorem on existence of 
covert channels in multitenant architecture. In 
section 5, we explain our framework and validate it 
with use of experiments and results. Finally 
manuscript is concluded with  a brief summary and 
future directions. 
 
2.    Related Work 
 
The need for cloud to be secure has lead to 
requirement of low cost framework for anomaly 
detection in cloud infrastructure. Covert channel 
attacks are such anomalies that are difficult to 
detect. A number of research papers have 
investigated the serious concern of Time Based 
Covert Channel Attacks in cloud 
environment(TBCA). A few are based on shape and 
regularity tests and measuring entropy of the data to 
determine the data is legitimate[3,11]. 
In [1] authors introduce a statistic called Minimal 
Requisite Fidelity that can result in disruption of 
communication in structure carriers and decrease the 
capacity/speed of the channel whose design allows 
steganographic analysis of the traffic. Most common 
approach for network analysis is "the wardens" 
approach that can detect such communication. There 
are two types of warden, one is active warden in 
which the network packets are intercepted and 
manipulated in the manner that all covert bits would 
be lost if any but this strategy is costly and 
manipulates information of innocuous traffic as 
well. In passive warden approach detection is done 
by capturing network traffic and only malicious 
traffic is altered. In certain other approaches 
[5,7,8,10] data is tested  to see if it carries a secret 
message. 
In [16] a solution to such attack is proposed by 
capturing all atomic instructions and replacing them 
as Trap to hypervisor. When the hypervisor 
intercepts this trap, it pauses the guest's vCPUs and 
executes the instruction without asserting the 
memory bus lock. Since the guest's vCPUs are 
paused, no other memory operations can be 
performed by this guest. But tackling situation in the 
manner has a limitation of slowing the system down 
which can have unwanted repercussions .  
  In [4] researchers have implemented an observer 
that uses a secure VM to compare traffic between a 
vulnerable VM and secure VM. This method can be 
used in real time. But crux here is maintaining a 
secure copy of every VM which itself becomes its 
limitation.  The framework in [20] offers a flexible 
system for detection by classifying their 
distributions as markovian when attack is being 
launched which attributes to the fact that time 
intervals placed during attack will be regular and 
authors have used it along with Bayesian training 
.This methodology has a prerequisite of strong 
interdependence assumption, which makes it 
suitable for certain type of covert channels . 
In cloud dynamicity of the system cause error 
rates to go high requiring new thresholds. Cabuk et 
al [10] have designed robust time based covert 
channel and proposed regularity(correlation in data) 
tests for detection of covert channels. With study of 
shape(mean ,variance, distribution) applying tests 
like Kolmogorov-Smirnov authors have claimed 
that it is possible to detect most covert channels. 
They have designed two metrics for packet arrival 
interval, one being regularity measure as mentioned 
in [20] above and another one being the regularity 
score which depicts the regularity of traffic with 
stream. In [11] researchers proposed conditional 
entropy based approach for covert channel 
detection. The authors have tested the time stamp on 
four metrics that are Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
score, regularity score , entropy and corrected 
conditional entropy. 
 
  
Similarly Berk el al[7] have proposed that 
probability of traffic being covert is a function of 
mean delay and total number of packets. The 
function is given by: 
             Pcc= (1-Xmean)/Xtotal . 
In [23] authors propose a scheme of Homealone that 
can detect any unusual cache activity when friendly 
VMs are silenced for a certain period. Though the 
original approach can be modified to enable 
detection , but this approach has a high overhead as 
suggested by researchers in [21]. 
In [24] Ruby et al. have demonstrated that why and 
how do covert channel attacks exist in current 
systems. Authors have proposed theorem and 
proved pertaining to conditions that must exist for 
covert channel to exist. The theorem states that if 
sender is able to invoke change(s) in the visible 
space of the receiver or sender is able to change 
when an object is updated relative to the observation 
made by the receiver, a covert channel may exist. 
Our work is related to [9] as they have proposed 
SVM based classifier, we use the same classifier 
because of its advantages in terms of accuracy and 
performance for low dimensional dataset. While 
authors  have used filtering of traffic captured by 
wireshark, we specifically focus on attacks in cloud 
and hence approach differs significantly. In our 
work we study conditions in which covert channel 
can exist in cloud.In [20] authors have proposed a 
hybrid approach for cloud based covert channel 
detection, where two level filtering of traffic 
happens to obtain thresholds. Assumption of 
markovian distribution is made in case of covert 
traffic and then training is based on bayesian 
classifier. The work is closely related to ours 
because one of the attack is replicated in similar 
manner and parameter of time interval is 
incorporated in our framework. 
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Figure1:Threat model showing covert 
communication between processi and processi+2  
 
features of scalability,dynamism and distributed 
processing. Our research is motivated by the fact 
that while significant research has been done in 
detecting TCBA,  no  approach exists which takes 
care of context and balanced learning of parameters 
so that false negatives have equal priority as false 
positives. These parameters in our approach are  
important in increasing accuracy and hence 
reliability.   
 
3. Framework Proposed for 
Detection 
 
This section discusses in detail the proposed 
framework and methods that lead to 
accomplishment of objective of detection of covert 
channels in cloud environment. 
 
3.1 System Threat Model 
The two popular categories of inter VM covert 
channel are: if the VMs are on same platform and 
the other one is when the VMs are on separate 
platform. The latter category consists of network 
based covert channels using TCP/IP header 
information like ISNs which hide confidential 
information and are randomly generated by the 
sender. Though such attacks are hard to detect but 
novel approaches using chaos theory have been 
successfully applied to detect such covert channels 
and such attacks are not new to cloud environment. 
The inter VM attacks on same platform are specific 
to cloud and bypass methods deployed for network. 
The threat model includes the attackers which have 
access to same VM as the victim .The malicious 
intentions of the attackers can be bypassing access 
control and leak confidential data or increase use of 
shared resource to deny essential services to co 
resident VMs. In cloud environment mainly two 
categories of attacks exist: 
1) Infrastructure based: The attacks that exploit 
hardware resources for communication like 
CPU based, cache based, memory based, 
disk based. 
2) Service based: Attacks launched while 
distribution of resources and during 
migration fall under this category. 
 Figure 1 depicts block representation of the threat 
model that exist in cloud under Infrastructure based 
attack category,which is in scope of the paper. In 
case 1 processi is communicating with processi+2 
using hardware resource requests. In case 2 processi 
is attacking processi+2 using another processi+1 of a 
different user application. These types of attacks are 
usually take place to choke the resources and deny 
services to user applications. In our paper we 
explore in detail case 1 of the threat model which 
involves leaking of information covertly. Threats 
that break the isolation layer of VMs by leaking 
information between VMs which are otherwise 
prohibited from communicating directly and want to 
share information illegitimately are part of our 
model. 
 
3.2     Methodology 
 
       3.2.1    Exploiting Co-residence 
There are minimum requirements to set up a covert 
channel. Theorem 1 stated below was proven by 
Ruby Lee[24] which pertains to fact that if the 
visible space (definition 1) exists then the covert 
channel may exist. But with respect to cloud we 
have a gap as no theorem has been proven in this 
regard. In theorem 1, we prove that 1 virtual 
machine though separated by hypervisor can invoke 
changes in visible space of another virtual machine. 
Definition 1: The visible space VS  is the set of all 
objects that the observing application can learn the 
value of object from its current abstraction level. 
 Theorem 1: If a virtual machine can invoke 
changes(s) in visible space of other virtual 
machines,a covert channel may exist. 
Proof: Let Vn denotes virtual environment which is 
a set of objects.Obi ԑ Vn  for i=1 to n, for n shared 
resources inclusive of time slice. Shared resources 
are abstracted by the layer hypervisor which is 
providing isolation. Request to a shared resource 
will be visible to receiver in the form of obtained 
resource time To. Thus To is dependent on Obi . 
Thus the dependency relation can be observed. 
  
   SenderObj= access(Obj) To Receiver 
 
This theorem states the necessary condition for 
covert channel to exist. It does not prove sufficient 
condition for covert channel to exist but if the given 
condition exists, the covert channel attack can 
happen. 
There have been research efforts [25] to show in 
public clouds that co-residency can be detected at 
very low cost and findings surprisingly show that 
despite  presence of big data centres , it is likely that 
after a few requests the VM will be co-located  with 
the required VM. This happens due to localized 
placement policies and thus normalized success rate 
would be very high. This brings out vulnerability in 
placement of major cloud service providers 
Azure,EC2,GCE. 
 Once co-residency is detected, it would be easy to 
abuse it with the algorithms used for manipulation 
of shared resources. Three algorithms are given in 
next section. 
 
       3.2.2   TBCA Algorithms  
              
Three TBCA algorithms are studied to test the 
performance of our framework. A brief description 
of the algorithms and their implementation in our 
experiments is provided in this section. 
The CPU load based algorithm is based on 
manipulating CPU load to transmit data secretly 
where two virtual machines have agreed on time 
interval for synchronization. To reduce chances in 
error propagation we have adapted the 
algorithm(Algorithm 1) in our experiments by 
keeping large margins(20%). 
 
Algorithm 1 : CPU Load Based Attack 
Algorithm 1(a) 
Input : B=sizeof(File to be leaked), R1= bit 1 
,R2=bit 0, m= threshold of CPU load to 
marginalize the attack(%), value_high and 
value_low are system configuration 
dependent values that can be determined 
during experimentation. 
Output: achieved time synchronization 
VM1: 
Begin 
 
1.    While B != EOF 
2.           If   R1= = 1 
3.              { m = value_high}  
  //difference between low and high is ~ 20%. 
4.             Else   
5.              {m = value_low}  
//VM1 pause for  t sec, causing load to drop. 
6.               End If 
7.       EndWhile 
                   End 
 
 
  Algorithm 1(b) 
Input : value_high and value_low 
Output: File B received by VM2 
VM2:    Begin     
     1.          If         
     2.                  {R1=R1+1}   
     3.          Else                                           
     4.         {  R1=R1+0 } 
      5.        Endif 
               End 
The cache based attacks exploit system cache for the 
purpose of covert communication. In algorithm 
adapted from standard cache algorithm, we have 
ignored certain aspects like scheduling difficulties to 
keep variables other than time constant. The 
colluding parties agree upon time intervals for 
which to keep cache busy and receiver requests for 
L2cache in those intervals as in most architectures 
L1 cache is not shared. 
Algorithm 2 : Cache Based Attack 
  Algorithm 2(a) 
Input : B=Sizeof cache (File to be leaked), 
R1= bit 1 , R2=bit 0, L= (end-
start)/CLK_TCK) \\elapsed time;   float 
start=clock(),Repeatedly read file into cache 
and flush to obtain estimate average system 
access latency to obtain t1, Created file F(B); 
Output : achieved time synchronization 
VM1:       Begin 
1. While (B)    Do   
2.    If (charb = = R1) 
              3.        {  start=clock() 
              4.         F(f_open)   
             5.         end=clock()    
              6.           } 





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
2
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m
           7.       Else 
           8.      {start=clock() 
        9.         end=clock()   } 
          10.             Endif 
        11.        EndWhile  
                      End 
Algorithm 2(b) 
Input : B=Sizeof cache (File to be leaked), 
R1= bit 1 , R2=bit 0, L= (end-
start)/CLK_TCK) \\elapsed time;  float 
start=clock(),Repeatedly read file into cache 
and flush to obtain estimate average system 
access latency to obtain t1, Created file F(B); 
Output : File B received by VM2 
VM2: Begin 
                 1.  Start=clock(); 
                 2.  F(f_open) 
                 3.  End=clock(); 
                 4.  If (L > t1)  
                  5.       { Output=Output+R1} 
                6.   Else 
                  7.      { Output=Output+R2} 
                  8.  Endif 
            End 
 
Memory based attacks model memory bus based 
attack in which contention of memory bus leads to 
leakage of bits from sender to receiver. The 
applications involved in leaking exploit shared 
resource bus which carries data to and from 
memory. This means that any request which 
involves accessing memory will ensure that bus is 
used. Certain commands like xchg allow automatic 
locking of memory bus before transaction can be 
completed while other commands need to be 
provided with prefix lock to ensure bus is locked 
before transmission of data between memory and 
registers.  
 
Algorithm 3: Memory Based Attack 
Algorithm 3(a) 
Input: N = no of bits to be sent, R1= bit 1 
,R2=bit 0,L= (end-start)/CLK_TCK) \\elapsed 
time ; float start=clock(); 
Output : achieved time synchronization 
VM1:       Begin 
               1.  While (B)    Do   
               2.           If (char(B) = = R1) 
 For t time put memory bus in contended state  
               3.          Else 
  For t time leave memory bus in free state 
               4.            End if 
               5.    Endwhile 
                 End 
 
Algorithm 3(b) 
Input: N = no of bits to be sent, R1= bit 1 
,R2=bit 0,L= (end-start)/CLK_TCK) \\elapsed 
time ; float start=clock(); 
Output : File B received by VM2 
VM2:   Begin 
               1. Start=clock() 
               2. Xchg mem_address, ax   
               3. End=clock()               
               4. If (L > t1)  
                5. {Output=Output+R1} 
                6.  Else 
                7.    { Output=Output+R2} 
                8.  Endif 
           End 
            3.3     Framework Overview 
 
In this section ,we present an overview of our 
proposed framework for covert channel based 
anomaly detection in cloud. Figure 2 shows block 
diagram representation of system model proposed 
for detection of covert channel based anomaly in 
cloud.It consists of 3 primary modules: a captor, 
signature builder and SVM (support vector 
machine)based classifier. 
The captor contains code for capturing data. The 
alternative approach could be to place a hook in the 
hypervisor. But this is applicable only in open 
source systems. In some cases system logs can also 
be used for the purpose. In cloud full access to log 
files might not be allowed as part of policy matters. 
The second one is the signature builder which is 
discussed in detail in the following section. In brief 
parameters resource time interval, resource 
usage(%) as context ,k-s test score are used to build 
signature. 
The value of k-s test score will depend on null 
hypothesis. If null hypothesis is rejected, score field 
will record 1 or if it fails to reject then score will be 
captured 0. A three tuple information for multiple 
record is passed to classifier <α,ß,c > where α stores 
time interval of   resource obtained c, ß contains k-s 
test score and c denotes context. After training 
model can be deployed on live cloud environment 
for detecting covert channels.   
 
        3.3.1  Signature Builder Process 
To initialize signature building process, we needed 
to acquire feature points for which we ran cronjob 
on ubuntu system to capture resources used time,  
percentage and certain other features obtained with 
top command and redirected its output to a file to 
log entries. The file records request of all VMs 
running in the setup. Relevant fields are filtered for 
feature extraction. This file currently contains overt 
traffic for our framework. Then for embedding 
TBCAs we rotate time interval by 7sec,10sec,20 sec 
after every 2 minute interval to avoid creating clear 
patterns for detection framework. The intervals are 
large so as to make detection harder by creating a 
low bandwidth channel. The receiver was 
synchronized to observe the changes in access 
latency. The features obtained for the purpose of 
building signature were resource usage time interval 
of application processes, two sample k-s test score, 
context variable percentage of resource usage. Data 
is divided into blocks and for each block k-s test 
score is calculated and stamped corresponding to 
each data point in the block. This is done to create  
matrix input for SVM classifier. Use of k-s test 
score as parameter will allow higher accuracy than 
just specifying time interval because in cloud due to 
scheduling patterns of processes, it is imperative 
that resource intervals in innocuous traffic will have 
certain patterns and it will not be completely 
random. Also additional parameter context will 
further fortify the framework in cloud as in certain 
cases patterns of resources will be misleading, so 
using amount of resource which will be standard for 
single application creating need for resource, helps 
maintain accuracy in detection. Besides as part of 
future work we would like to scale this framework’s 
utility to incorporate anomaly detection. The use of 
context variable will be required. 
  We selected a 10,000 samples from each week’s 
readings from experiment run for 4 weeks. These 
40,000 data points were divided into chunks of 5000 
samples each. The 8 blocks thus formed are used to 
build signature for the distributed classification. The 
purpose of large block sizes is to enable faster 
processing in distributed learning environment. The 
data set so obtained is re-divided to have smaller 
block size this time to study impact on detection 
    Captor Signature     
Builder 
 
Distributed 
Classifier 
Resource 
request traffic 
Figure 2: The Proposed Framework 
process. This holds for cases where covert attacks 
are done just to leak keys and not data file. 
Detection framework should be able work on small 
training dataset as cloud is dynamic environment 
and migration happens frequently. Though for 
processing and training on large data in less time is 
made feasible by distributed algorithm but at certain 
times samples less than a day’s log may only be 
available which on an average for slow speed 
channel is ~300 samples. Since small sample set 
doesn’t represent the population well, any detection 
mechanism based on distribution assumption or 
parametric statistical approach will not perform 
well. Thus non parametric tests are more suitable as 
well as use of machine learning algorithms are 
imperative. Thus we obtain 200 sample block from 
40,000 data points which is less than a day’s run. 
The features are then added to dataset by calculating 
scores for each block and spreading it against each 
data point in the block to create matrix. Then to 
ensure balanced learning we take approach of equal 
data points for positive and negative samples. From 
each block we segregate positives and negatives and 
then code written in matlab is run to pick top n/2 
samples of positives and top n/2 samples of 
negatives. If the negative samples are less than n/2, 
using stamping negative samples were just repeated 
randomly to obtain n/2 samples where n is size of 
the block.   
 
3.3.2 Proposed Algorithm  
 
In this section we discuss in detail the algorithm we 
have proposed for implementation of the framework 
discussed in the last section . The algorithm runs in 
two phases, initial phase builds signature based on 
identified parameters while in second phase this 
signature output becomes input and distributed 
learning of the algorithm takes place. 
 
ALGORITHM 4 : Kernel Context_Covert 
Channel Detection 
 
Input :User[m][n] is input file representing 
resource usage activity of n applications 
containing m features. User_time (ut)  
represents m dimensional array containing 
resource usage time request/allocation of n 
users. m, n ε N, f is distribution function 
obtained from sampled values while g is 
gaussian distribution function, z denotes 
amount of resource usage. 
Output: A three tuple signature <α,ß,c> 
            Begin 
         1.   For i = 1 to n do 
         2.   For j=1 to m do 
         3.         xi = utij+1 – utij  
         4.    EndFor 
         5.    EndFor 
         6.    For i= 1 to k 
          7.   ßi =      i
ii
x
xmeanx

)(
 
 
           8.   αi =   
)()(sup ii xgxf
x

 
 
           9.    ci =  zi 
           10.  EndFor 
End 
 
 
ALGORITHM 5.  Distributed Classification 
 Input: VMi, <α,ß,c>,n is total number 
of data points and  m is number of 
VMs,sv denotes support vectors 
Output: Output[n] , array of decision 
variables denoting attack or innocuous traffic. 
           Begin 
1. For i=1 to m 
2.   For VMi = <α,ß,c> 
3.     Result=svi.alpha||svi+1.alpha 
4.     Outputn= Result >0                
5.    Endfor 
6.   Endfor 
                End 
 
The algorithm 4 is proposed is input to algorithm 5. The 
steps discuss in detail the process to be followed. In step 1 
time interval of resource request is calculated from initial 
and final time stamps of resource requests by a process. 
In step 3  sample  values are obtained after rotating 
intervals to obtain a vector x[k]. In step 7 using z-
score normalization values are obtained in ßi so as to 
avoid learning by algorithm from magnitude of 
values. In step 8, the vector contained in αi is k-s test 
score . Vector c contains context variable and is 
assigned values in step 9. This signature is input to 
algorithm 5, which distributes the signature to 
multiple VMs in step 2 such that each VM has equal 
number of positive and negative training examples  :  
                 
        iii CVMi ,,    (process of mapping) 
    
m
i
isvsv
1
    for sv.α >0  (process of reducing) 
 Then output of each VM is recorded and filtered such that 
positive alphas from the output of the structure are picked 
in step 4. The so obtained structure after training is now 
ready to be deployed and tested in cloud. 
 
4. Experiments and Discussion 
 
In this section, we present the results obtained by 
our framework using support vector machine based 
classifier. Results presented pertain to faster training 
in distributed classifier approach compared to single 
machine processing. With big dataset processing in 
non distributed environment was only possible as 
processing is done on block basis. If  block size is 
increased to reach around 4 blocks of 10,000 
samples each, it is not possible to process on a 
single machine using support vector machines 
,which is an inherent limitation of the method. So 
for the purpose of generalization  for bigger block 
sizes in cloud, we evaluate using distributed 
classifier. In our experiments, we considered three 
different categories of covert timing channels based 
on the resources exploited. In replicating the attack 
,we take utmost care to make sure the stealth of the 
attack is high. We build signature using time 
interval, k-s test score and context variables. The 
signature of applications’ resource behavior now 
goes down the pipeline and classifier module 
processes it. Use of support vector machine based 
classifier is important module because of the 
following reason. It is depicted in the graph 1, k-s 
test scores of time interval in covert and overt 
traffic, show very close scores and overlap in certain 
cases making this feature unreliable(shown with 
arrows). It is visible that after certain time intervals 
bus channel and cache based attacks show overlap . 
This will be difficult to detect if we merely rely on 
k-s test scores. Thus use of context and machine 
learning will facilitate detection. 
 
4.1 CPU load based attacks  
 
In CPU-load based attack[19-20], attacker VM 
launches an attack by making sudden bursts of 
requests for CPU resource. For a covert channel 
attack sender sends more than 100 user requests in 
burst to transmit a bit 1 and no request is made for a 
bit 0.With time synchronization after a time gap of 
every 10 secs request for the resource is made. One 
of the colluding VM with sensitive information 
intending to leak it, has Apache JMeter tool, usually 
used to load test a website and spy VM has a static 
website running on it. We can use JMeter to specify 
the user load and control cpu usage of the system 
which gives spy 1 bit if load is high and 0 bit if load 
is low. Also the attack can be used to launch denial 
of service against a VM with web server by sending 
request bursts with 500 or 1000 users (threads) as it 
takes CPU usage upto 99%. A simplified version 
exploited CPU as shared resource on a windows  
based system. Monitoring tool can be used by the 
receiver to interpret the bits. In covert channel 
attacks care has to be taken not to make time 
difference very significant using load as covertness 
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Figure 3 : graph showing k-s test on overt and covert channels 
is inversely proportional to accuracy and bandwidth 
of the channel making it easily detectable, so based 
on the system we can decide ideal number of 
threads as we run the application. Depicted in 
Figure 3 are corresponding variations in resource 
monitor. The windows based setup is used along 
with debian to ensure attack parameters confirm to 
standards in different platforms. Tools 
Used:Jmeter(java desktop application designed to 
load test behaviour and performance);Static web 
site(created for experiment).; 2 Virtual Machines 
each with following configuration: 512 MB  RAM 
(expandable),1 cpu core,127 GB HDD. 
 
 N= 5000 N= 200 
Overt Covert Overt Covert 
Overt  96 4 86 14 
Covert 0 100 0 100 
Table 2: Confusion matrix when testing presence 
of CPU load based channels(in %) 
 
4.2 Cache based attacks  
 
    Cache based covert channels don't have a very 
high bandwidth or accuracy as cache scheduling 
uncertainty in both lab and Amazon EC2 leads to 
error rate of around 30 percent to 85 percent [22] 
while raw bandwidth is around 190 kb/s and though 
cache based covert channels have a number of 
limitations in virtual environment like migration etc 
nonetheless it offers a good case to be studied for 
our detection framework. In [21] authors have 
experimentally shown access latency caused to 
attack. As in cloud access time is the resource being 
exploited, so receiver first tests access latency by 
loading a file as big as cache size of the machine to 
fill entire cache and then access it to keep track of 
lower threshold of access latency. Then in a 2 VM 
setup whenever sender VM wants to send bit 1 then 
it fills cache will equally large file to fill cache so 
that when at stipulated time interval receiver VM 
access its file it will cause higher latency than 
measured earlier. This way attacker(sender) and 
spy(receiver) synchronize to leak sensitive bits of 
data and the process continues till all the bits are 
leaked.  
 
 N= 5000 N= 200 
Overt Covert Overt Covert 
Overt  90 10 80 20 
Covert 0 100 0 100 
Table 3: Confusion matrix when testing presence 
of cache based channels(in %) 
 
4.3 Memory bus based attacks  
Whenever memory bus is put in contended state as 
its being shared by VMs and there is a delay in 
accessing the bus,it will be noticed by the receiver 
VM. This attack as explained in [21] is carried out 
by a sender sending the packet by causing latency in 
accessing the memory bus by the receiver. This is 
interpreted as high and low signal. Wu et al have 
demonstrated that bus contention based attack can 
achieve a high bandwidth of over 100-bits per 
second which can steal a thousand byte private key 
file in less than 3 minutes. This attack is hard to 
detect because of its negligible impact on 
performance of cache causing transparency for any 
cache based detection techniques. This validates our 
choice of parameters .It  will be hard to capture such 
attacks by performance based detection frameworks. 
Minimum latency occurs when transmitting a 0. 
Latency is calculated as Mean(Access Time)- Base 
time. In bus contention based channel ,contention is 
created on front side bus using atomic instructions 
xchg 8086 instruction for exchanging memory with 
register which forcefully locks bus.There are many 
instructions in assembly that can be used to 
deliberately create contention but might require use 
of lock prefix. A predefined threshold time is agreed 
between two programs. Then if at receiver end  
mean(access time)  >  threshold  bit is interpreted as 
1 else 0. If too many consecutive 1s or 0s,receiver 
can assume that sender process has been 
rescheduled by the hypervisor. 
 
 N= 5000 N= 200 
Overt Covert Overt Covert 
Overt  94 6 84 16 
Covert 0.5 99.5 4 96 
Table 4 : Confusion matrix when testing 
presence of memory bus based channels(in %) 
 
4.4  Performance metrics  
We used MATLAB’s built in SVM-classifier 
initially and then we distributed the code over 
different VMs for processing. The algorithm 4 and 5 
shown in section 3.3.2 is implemented in Matlab 
and cross validated across machines. 
The classifier was optimized using Box –Constraint 
and Kernel parameter was set to rbf. The non linear 
transform using Radial Basis function is able to 
provide separation even when circular line is 
required for separating in x-space(non- hyperplane 
space). The parameters worked well even when we 
input certain non separable data. Though to reduce 
training and cross validation error but at the same 
time we did not overfit the function as we used 
distributed instances of SVM and threshold values 
were different so we took an average of  values to 
calculate one acceptable threshold .Arguably 
authors believe average best depicts fits while 
making choice out of multiple instances of same 
variable. Context variables have a significant 
contribution which becomes apparent from our 
experimental results. To verify we trained and tested 
with and without the use of context. As shown in 
figure 4, the gap between specificity and sensitivity 
closes with the use of context. Besides our approach 
as compared to C
2 
detector performs well. 
In absence of real life cloud which is a noisy 
environment , authors check the robustness of 
method proposed and how fast it would deteriorate 
in performance if we added some noise to the data. 
In fact in practical scenarios such situations will be 
common.5%  gaussian noise is added to vector 
latency. The error rate increased by .6% which is 
under tolerance limit .Also for comparison purposes 
and for the sake of completeness in validating our 
approach in comparison with contemporary 
approaches, in our tests we applied Neural network 
for training and testing on data using 10-fold cross 
validation. The results are shown in Graph3.The 
choice of SVM as a classifier had many advantages 
over ANN like ability to converge faster, accuracy. 
By theory SVM is less prone to overfitting and has 
global unique maxima unlike ANNs. We tested NN 
performance and error rate was higher at 8% in first 
training. It did improve as we retrain the network 
but as our model is required for real time scenarios, 
time required for training should be minimum. 
Initially we trained NN for three features on 6 
neurons(taking ideal case of 2N+1). Thus 
comparative analysis yields better results with 
SVM. 
    
5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
Current techniques of covert channel detection 
target very specific covert channels which means 
they wont be able to detect channels which are 
related. Hence we have proposed a method which 
doesn’t lose original parameters that will help in 
extension of our method and enable generalization. 
In the paper we have used performance metrics and 
high activity as parameters for detection of the bus 
contention time channel but as we try to generalize 
this model, we might come across time channels 
that are clever enough to leave no footprints, keep 
activity levels lower than the threshold and do not 
affect the performance of the system. Therefore in 
future we plan to propose a detection framework 
that is more robust to such techniques and and 
generalizable to build signatures or profiles of new 
anomalies in real time. In future we plan to propose 
a framework for anomaly detection in cloud ,which 
is highly dynamic and the approach should be able  
 
Figure4: graph showing specificity and 
sensitivity 
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 to cover all possible parameters so that adaption is 
possible and new anomalies can be covered. 
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 Appendix A. Screenshots and Graphs 
The framework has been realized based on 
experiments conducted for data collection. The 
graphical tools and C language, matlab codes were 
used for data collection. Tools used for conducting 
experiments are shown in following subsections 
along with snapshots. 
        A.1 Screenshots 
Jmeter is a pure java based graphical server 
performance testing tool, for both static and 
dynamic resources (files or CGI, Servlets, Perl 
scripts). It is designed to test load, functional 
performance, regression etc. The screenshot shows 
we dramatically increased load on server which 
contains our static website. The performance 
monitor captures results as shown in figure B. 
         
Fig-A: Snapshot of JMeter Tool 
  
  
A.2 Tool matlab 
 
To enable noisy environment in our cloud testbed, 
we used matlab functionality. The graph in figure C 
depicts SNR or signal to noise ratio between the 
actual data and the syntheticall added noise. This 
graph is important to show that the noise was 
distributed throughout. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
           Figure C: SNR in matlab 
        Figure B: Graph showing resource usage changes 
